We propose two simple mechanisms that implement two bargaining sets in super-additive environments. The first bargaining set is a close variation of the one Ž . proposed by L. Zhou 1994, Games Econom. Beha¨. 6, 512᎐526 , and the second is Ž the Pareto optimum payoffs of the A. Mas-Colell 1989, J. Math. Econom. 18, . 129᎐139 bargaining set. We adopt a simple framework in which the cooperative outcomes are realized as non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies of a two-stage game played by an auxiliary set of individuals competing over the cooperative agents. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
Cooperative game theory models the interaction existing in economic and social environments, emphasizing the advantages of cooperation. The different solution concepts put forward in this theory suggest reasonable ways for the split of the surplus of such cooperation among the various parties.
The most popular cooperative solution concept is the core, which selects those allocations from which no coalition of players can profitably deviate. However, the core ignores subsequent reactions that the deviations can generate. These reactions may render the initial deviation nonprofitable. A subclass of solutions taking into account the future consequences of current actions consists of bargaining sets. The first definition of a bargain-Ž . ing set was suggested by Aumann and Maschler 1964 . In recent years, several other bargaining sets have been defined and analyzed by Mas-Colell Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . 1989 , Vohra 1991 , Vind 1992 , and Zhou 1994 . An excellent survey of Ž . the literature can be found in Maschler 1992 . The different definitions of the bargaining set share the common feature of being based on the Ž . Ž concepts of objection deviation and counter-objection reaction to the . deviation . However, they propose slightly different meanings for these concepts. In contrast to the core, the bargaining sets are non-empty for a large class of games.
A shortcoming common to cooperative solution concepts is the lack of an explicit framework by which they can be reached. The area of research known as implementation theory ''rigorously investigates the correspon-Ž dence between normative goals and institutions designed to achieve im-. Stearns 1968 and Maschler and Peleg 1976 construct dynamical systems that converge to points in the Aumann and Maschler bargaining set. However, these systems ignore any strategic consideration on the part of the players and can be manipulated by strategic agents.
In this paper, we propose two simple mechanisms that implement two bargaining sets in super-additive environments. The simplicity of these mechanisms is in contrast to the mechanisms suggested in most works. These traditional mechanisms are quite intricate and require a large degree of sophistication on the part of the designer and the participating agents. 2 We adopt a rather simple framework as suggested by Perez- 
Ž
. See, for example, the mechanisms proposed by Moore and Repullo 1988 and Ž . Sen 1990 , which apply to a much larger class of problems and environments. Ž equilibria of a game played by an auxiliary set of individuals or institu-. Ž tions competing over the agents that are the players in the cooperative . game .
The first bargaining set that we implement is a close variation of the one Ž . proposed by Zhou 1994 . In both sets, the counter-objection must involve some player from both the objection and the remaining set. The only Ž . difference between the two sets is that, in contrast to Zhou 1994 , we do not impose the condition that a counter-objection should not contain the Ž objection. In the mechanism that we propose, three principals exogenous . players that maximize profits compete over the agents of the game. Competition occurs in two stages. In the first stage, principals 1 and 2 make simultaneous offers to the agents. Each agent is then provisionally assigned to the principal having made the highest offer to her, where ties are broken in favor of principal 1. If one principal hires the whole set of agents the assignment becomes definitive, salaries are paid, and the game ends. Otherwise, principal 3 has the possibility of submitting a new offer. This new offer has preferential status, in the sense that principal 3 only has to match the maximal provisional offer to attract an agent. However, the final set of workers hired by this principal must contain, if it is not empty, agents from the two groups provisionally formed at stage 1. After this, principals pay salaries to the agents that were assigned to them, receive the value of the coalition composed of these agents, and the game Ž . ends. This mechanism implements in subgame perfect equilibrium SPE in pure strategies the bargaining set that we propose.
We also implement in SPE the set of efficient allocations in the Ž . Mas-Colell 1989 bargaining set through a mechanism similar to, although somewhat more complicated than, the previous mechanism. The main difference between the two mechanisms is that in the second, we assume that principals strictly prefer employing more rather than less agents. This can be interpreted as being part of the design of the game: the designer asks the principals to maximize profits, but also, other things being equal, to hire as many agents as possible.
The rules of the two games are straightforward and rely to a large degree on the intuition underlying the definition of bargaining sets. Using Ž . exogenous players allows us to avoid both the use of ''modulo integer games,'' and the problem of feasibility of the out-of-equilibrium outcomes.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic cooperative game. In Section 3 we implement a close variant of the Zhou Ž . 1994 bargaining set, while in Section 4 we implement the Pareto optimal Ž . part of the Mas-Colell 1989 bargaining set. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
THE COOPERATIVE GAME
Ž . An n-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair N, Ä 4 N where N s 1, 2, . . . , n is the set of agents and¨: 2 ª R is the charac-Ž .
N teristic function which satisfies s 0. The members of 2 represent all the possible coalitions of agents. The characteristic function yields the maximal payoff any coalition can obtain when its members cooperate. We Ž . Ž . Ž . assume that the game is super-additive, i.e., S j T G S q T if S l T s . Moreover, in order to simplify the proofs and to avoid excessive notation, we proceed under the assumption that the preceding in-Ä 4 equality is strict if S j T s N and S f , N . Once we have presented our results under this strong super-additivity assumption, we will indicate how the mechanisms can be modified to obtain the same results under the usual super-additivity assumption.
Ž .
n For any vector x s x , x , . . . , x g R and any subset S : N, we
A payoff vector for the game N, is any vector
We denote by S s NrS the complement of the subset S in N. Ž A solution concept for cooperative games associates a set possibly . empty of payoff vectors with each game. The description of the solution does not involve any procedures through which the agents can achieve an outcome in the solution. The solution concept merely prescribes a set of requirements that payoff vectors must satisfy in order to constitute part of the solution.
The basic components of the definition of a bargaining set are the notions of objection and counter-objection. The different bargaining sets proposed in the literature diverge on the precise definitions of these two concepts. We start by providing the basic set of definitions we are going to use. Ž . z g R is said to be a counter-objection to S, y if z T s T and the following two conditions are satisfied:
The core is the set of all payoff vectors against which there is no objection. It is well known that the core may be empty. Furthermore, the definition of the core ignores subsequent actions. It may well be that the objection to a payoff vector not in the core may set in motion a process that would hurt the objecting individuals. Such a process is the rationale behind the counter-objection. Notice that the counter-objection may generate further deviations, which are ignored in our analysis. See Dutta, Ray, Ž . Sengupta, and Vohra 1989 for the construction of a bargaining set that takes into account objections of any order.
Ž . To define the bargaining set BS , we introduce the definition of a Ž . justified objection. An objection S, y to the payoff x is said to be justified Ž . if there is no counter-objection to S, y . The bargaining set of the Ž . Ž . cooperative game N, , denoted by BS N, , is the set of all payoff configurations x g R n against which there is no justified objection. The BS we define is very close to the definition proposed by Zhou Ž . Ž . 1994 . In his paper, the condition BS1 also requires that SrT / . For any given objection, there are more counter-objections satisfying our Ž . condition BS1 than counter-objections satisfying Zhou's definition. Hence, objecting is more difficult in our setting and therefore the BS defined here is larger. Since Zhou's BS is non-empty, ours is non-empty as well. Note Ž .
Ž . also that every payoff in the BS is efficient, i.e., x N s N for all Ž . x g BS N, . However, it is not necessarily the case that the payoffs in the BS are individually rational, while Zhou's BS does satisfy this property. . payoff vectors see . We denote by POMBS the set of Pareto optimal payoff vectors in MBS.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BARGAINING SET
In this section we describe a non-cooperative mechanism whose equilib-Ž . rium outcomes coincide with the BS N, previously described. The mechanism is intended to solve the problem of a designer who does not know the characteristic function and yet wants to attain outcomes in the BS. The mechanism is to be played by players who are different from the agents described in Section 2. These new players will be called principals. There are three principals, 1, 2, and 3, a typical principal will be denoted by j. The principals will compete over the agents via wage offers made to the agents. The payoff of a principal hiring a subset S of the agents is the Ž . difference between S , that is, the value of the coalition of the agents, and the sum of wages paid out. We interpret this to mean that the designer hires some managers to play the game and offers them the value of the coalitions they hire as payment, but they have to pay the wages they offer to the agents hired.
The mechanism H is played as follows.
Stage 1. Each principal j, for j s 1, 2, submits an offer x j g R n , where x j is the amount principal j would pay to agent i if he were employed by i her. The offers are made simultaneously. Each agent is provisionally assigned to the principal who submits the highest wage for that agent, Q Ä 1 2 4 which is x s Max x , x . In case of identical maximal offers, agent i is
assigned to principal 1. At the end of stage 1 we have two subsets of agents denoted by S 1 and S 2 , where S j is the set of agents assigned to principal j, for j s 1, 2.
If there exists a principal ␣ for which S ␣ s N, the game ends with all agents employed by principal ␣ , the payoff to agent i is x ␣ , the payoff to Ž j . j Ž j . payoffs to the principals are¨T y x T , for j s 1, 2, 3.
The main purpose of this section is to show that the mechanism H implements the BS in pure strategies. That is, the set of subgame perfect Ž . equilibria in pure strategies SPE of the non-cooperative mechanism H coincides with the BS. Previous to the theorem, we present the following two properties of the BS that will be useful in the proof of the implementation result.
Ž .
n LEMMA 1. S, y is a justified objection to x g R if and only if for e¨ery Ž . T : N satisfying condition BS1 :
Proof. It is easy to see from the definition of a counter-objection that Ž . there exists a counter-objection to an objection S, y if and only if there
Q.E.D. 
Ž . objection for which yЈ S -S is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
We now present our first main result. Ž pals 1 and 2 submit the offers x s x s x. At stage 2 if this stage is . reached principal 3 makes an offer that guarantees to her the highest possible profit, given the strategies actually played at stage 1. We claim that these strategies constitute a SPE whose outcome is that principal 1 Ž hires the whole set N at salaries x. Note that if principals 1 and 2 use the . previous strategies, stage 2 is not reached.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that there is a profitable deviation by a principal h. The deviation must take place at stage 1, since by definition no profitable deviation exists for principal 3. Denote by y h g R n the deviating offer. Since the deviation gives a strictly positive Ž . Ž . profit to the principal and x N s N , principal h must end up with a proper subset of N after stage 1, denoted by S h . Moreover, y h G x for all
hX h h i g S and y S -¨S . Let us take y s y q for all i g S , with
. n is, T : N satisfies BS1 i.e., T l S / and T l S / and z g R Ž .
If the deviation takes place, both principals end up hiring a proper subset of N at stage 1, and the game goes to stage 2. Principal 3 then has the possibility of making the offer x 3 , with agent i . The strategy x guarantees strictly positive profits to principal 3, 3 Ž . Ž . since agents hired by principal 3 are exactly those in T and x T -T . However, it is not necessarily the best strategy for principal 3. Now, we claim that any strategy that maximizes principal 3's profits must leave principal h with non-positive profits. Otherwise, principal 3 will obtain higher profits by hiring both of her group of agents and the remaining group of agents of principal h, at the corresponding salaries, and she will obtain at least the same profits as the sum of the profits of both principals, since the game is super-additive. Therefore, principal h cannot obtain strictly positive profits. Hence, there is no profitable deviation at stage 1.
b Now we prove that any payoff that is the outcome of an SPE of Ž . H is in BS N, . We proceed by several steps. Throughout the proof, we denote by x F g R n the wages actually paid to the agents. That is, either 
b1 In any SPE, one principal must hire all the agents. We prove the statement by contradiction. Suppose it is not the case. Since profits Ž must be non-negative at equilibrium otherwise, a principal with negative profits could deviate making offers xЈ s yϱ for i s 1, . . . , n, not hiring i .
F Ž j . Ž j . Ž any agents , it is the case that x T F T note that if there are more . than one principal hiring agents, stage 2 has necessarily been reached .
Ž . Ž 1 . Moreover, the super-additivity assumptions imply that N ) T q Ž 2 . Ž 3 . T q T , since at least two sets are non-empty. Then, we claim that there is a profitable deviation by principal 3: y 3 s x F . Following this deviation, principal 3 hires the whole set N, making profits:
In any SPE, all principals make zero profits. Suppose that it is not the case, so the principal that, at equilibrium, hires all the agents Ž . F Ž . Ž makes positive profits, that is, N ) x N . Either principal 1 or 2 or . both obtain zero profits at equilibrium. Suppose it is principal 2. Then, she could deviate from her initial strategy making an offer y 2 s x F q , for all i i Ž . F Ž . i g N, with ) 0 but small enough so that N ) x N q N. This ensures that principal 2 hires all the agents and makes strictly positive profits. and the set S is hired by principal 1 at stage 1. Second, principal 1 makes Ž . 1 Ž . strictly positive profits if she keeps S after stage 2, since S ) y S . Ž . Third, given that the deviation S, y is justified, there is no counter-objec-
. Therefore, every offer in which principal 3 ends up with a non-empty subset of agents yields negative profits to this principal. Hence, principal 1 keeps the set S at stage 2, so y 1 is a profitable deviation.
We have proven that the salaries actually paid to the agents constitute a Ž . payoff in BS N, . Therefore, the equilibrium outcome constitutes a Ž . payoff in BS N, .
The mechanism H is a simple mechanism that allows the designer to reach the set of outcomes that are in the BS of the game. The definition of Ž . the BS we use is different from even if very closely related to other definitions proposed in the literature. The two features of our BS that are Ž . crucial for the implementation via mechanism H described above are as follows:
Ž . i In the definition of a counter-objection, it is sufficient that the agents receive the same payment that they are offered either in the main Ž . proposal or in the objection. That is, in the condition BS2 there must be weak inequalities. Otherwise, in mechanism H, there does not exist a maximum for the program of the principal called to play at stage 2. Moreover, and more importantly, this is the characteristic that makes Lemmas 1 and 2 hold. That is, it ensures that any objector has the option to make strictly positive profits.
ii The restrictions that the counter-objector faces must be symmetric in the sense that they apply in the same way to the objector and to the original proposer, so that it is not necessary to identify the objector in order to operate the mechanism. Determining the identity of the objector Ž without knowing the characteristic function which we assume is known . only by the agents and the principals and not by the designer is very problematic and is not possible in mechanism H. These two features enable us to make the following comment. If we take an alternative definition of the bargaining set that accords with our Ž . definition of an objection, but for which condition BS1 is different and Ž . consider an alternative condition for BS1 that is symmetric, in the sense that we can exchange the roles of S and S c without modifying the condition, a mechanism very similar to H implements this alternative bargaining set.
We do not think a mechanism along the lines of mechanism H can Ž . Ž . implement a BS that fails to satisfy requirement ii . Zhou's 1994 BS specifies non-symmetric restrictions. Therefore we do not implement it, Ž . although it satisfies i . This is the reason why we adopted a slightly different definition.
Ž . On the other hand, the BS proposed by Mas-Colell 1989 does satisfy Ž .
Ž . ii , but it fails to satisfy i . In order to implement the MBS, we first have to modify the second step of the mechanism so that there is a maximum of the program of principal 3 and second, to introduce new incentives for the principals to deviate, even if they will not obtain profits. Moreover, the fact that an M-objection requires strict inequalities only for one of the deviating agents also makes the task more difficult. The next section shows one way to deal with the preceding problems.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARETO OPTIMAL MAS-COLELL BARGAINING SET
We now construct a new mechanism HЈ whose SPE outcomes coincide with the set of Pareto optimum payoff vectors in the Mas-Colell bargaining Ž . set POMBS . As previously, the players are the principals who compete over the agents. We now assume that there are four principals. We add one further assumption that principals, all other things being equal, strictly prefer employing more rather than less agents. This can be viewed as a tie-breaking rule that introduces lexicographic preferences whereby the principals' first criterion is profit maximization and the second criterion is hiring the largest possible group of agents. This assumption is restrictive but it is necessary to provide the motivation for objections since a justified M-objection always yields zero profits. Abreu and Rubinstein 1988 assume that preferences over monetary payoffs and complexity are lexicographic: machine A is strictly preferred to machine B if it yields higher monetary payoff or it yields the same payoff with lower complexity. The treatment of ties has also received attention in the learning literature, where it is shown that different tie breaking Ž Ž. . rules lead to very different outcomes see, for example, Monderer and Sela 1996 . The mechanism consists of two stages. In the first stage, principals 1 and 2 submit wage offers and, in the second stage, principals 3 and 4 possibly bid for the right to make a second proposal, possibly enticing a new set of agents to work for them. The formal description of the mechanism HЈ is as follows.
Stage 1. Principals 1 and 2 submit simultaneous offers x 1 , x 2 g R n . Should one offer weakly dominate another, the weakly dominated offer is discarded. Among the remaining offers, each agent is assigned to the principal who submitted the highest wage for that agent, namely x Q s i Ä 1 2 4 Max x , x . In case of identical offers, agent i is assigned to the principal i i whose sum of offers is the smallest; in case of identical sums, he is assigned to principal 1. At the end of this stage there are two subsets of agents denoted by S 1 and S 2 , where S j is the set of agents assigned to principal j.
If there exists a principal ␣ for which S ␣ s N, all agents are employed by principal ␣, the payoff to agent i is x ␣ , the payoff to principal ␣ is i Ž . ␣ Ž . N y x N , the other principals obtain zero profits, and the game ends. Otherwise, we go to stage 2. Ä Q ␤ 4 payoff to agent i, for i s 1, . . . , n, is Max x , x , to which agent 1 adds
␤ the bid b . The payoffs to the principals are T y x T y b for principal ␤, zero for the principal different from ␤ and playing at stage 2, Ž j . j Ž j . and T y x T , for the principals j s 1, 2.
Prior to stating the theorem we introduce one additional definition. We now show that the SPE of mechanism HЈ described above coincide with the set of payoff vectors in POMBS. 
Ž Q . among the largest sets that produce profit B x .
If the previous strategies are followed, principal 1 will hire all the agents at stage 1 with zero profits and the agents will be paid according to x. To see that the previous strategies constitute a SPE of the mechanism HЈ, let us first analyze stage 2. The strategy of a principal j, for j s 3, 4, in stage 2
consists of sending the message B x , x , where the offer x leaves Ž Q . principal j with one of the coalitions guarantying profits B x . The coordinates of x j over the coalition would coincide with the wage offers each coalition member holds from the previous stage. To see that these messages comprise a Nash equilibrium, consider a subgame where
s 0, then any deviation would generate either no . change or negative profits . The outcome of the previous strategies is that principal 3 employs one of the largest possible set of agents while still Ž Q . making zero profits, since the bid B x is precisely the difference between the value of the coalition hired by the principal and the sum of the salaries paid to this coalition. A higher bid would generate losses for any principal. A lower bid for principal 3 would result in principal 3 not hiring any agents and thus would make the principal worse off, while it could not change the outcome if made by principal 4.
Let us now analyze stage 1. Suppose there is a deviation y h which, when Ä 4 announced by principal h g 1, 2 in stage 1, leads to a strictly preferred outcome for principal h. This deviation must leave principal h with positive profits if h s 1, or with non-negative profits and a non-empty set of employees if h s 2. In either case, following the deviation, both principals employ non-empty sets of agents at the end of stage 1. Hence, following a potentially profitable deviation, the mechanism moves into stage 2. Denote by S h the set of agents provisionally employed by the deviating principal at the end of stage 1. weakly dominated by the offer of principal 1, which results in not hiring . any agents . If principal 1 is the deviator, this can be profitable only if
hence B x ) 0 holds as well. Therefore, the bid that principals 3 and 4 will submit at stage 2 is positive.
As a result of the Nash equilibrium for the game beginning at stage 2, the deviating principal h in stage 1 cannot be better off. We show that either principal h has strictly negative profits or ends up employing no agents at all. Suppose that at the end of stage 2, h employs a non-empty
Ž h . set T of agents with y T F T . Then, due to the super-additivity assumption, it is not possible that the winning bid and wage offer proposed in stage 2 were the best response. The coalition could have been enlarged without decreasing profits. Hence, in the case where principal h employs any agents the profits are negative. Therefore, there cannot be a profitable deviation in stage 1.
Ž .
b We now prove that any payoff that is the outcome of an SPE of Ž . HЈ is in the POMBS N, . Note that we can mimic the proofs of steps Ž .
Ž . b1 and b2 in Theorem 1 to prove the following two claims. First, in any SPE one principal must hire all the agents. Second, in any SPE all principals make zero profits.
Given the two previous properties, the sum of payments by the principal Ž . who hires all the agents in equilibrium is N , so we obtain efficiency. If this payment vector does not belong to the POMBS, there exists a justified Ž . Ä 4 objection S, y . A principal h g 1, 2 not employing any agents who deviate at stage 1 offering y h s y for i g S and y h s yϱ for i g S c can i i i Ž employ the coalition S the offer y is not weakly dominated by x and Ž . Ž . . y N -x N , so the agents in S are assigned to principal h . If coalition S after stage 2 is maintained, the deviating principal is better off. Since the objection is justified, any principal bidding b j ) 0 in stage 2 would make strictly negative profits. Hence, the outcome of stage 1 remains, and the deviating principal has profited. This is in contradiction to the fact that we were at an SPE.
We have constructed the mechanisms implementing the bargaining sets under a strong super-additivity assumption. This hypothesis simplifies the presentation since every efficient outcome involves the formation of the grand coalition. We now indicate the modifications needed when efficient outcomes can also be generated by partitions other than the grand coalition. Let us call an efficient structure a partition of the set of agents such that the sum of the value of the coalitions in the partition equals the value of the grand coalition. Denote by D the maximum number of coalitions an efficient structure could possibly contain.
We introduce two modifications in the mechanism H. First, we assume that there are at least D q 1 principals competing over the agents at stage 1. Second, at stage 2, that is reached if there are at least two principals which are provisionally assigned agents at stage 1, a non-empty set hired by principal D q 2 must intersect with all non-empty sets provisionally assigned to principals at stage 1. This mechanism implements the BS. As to mechanism HЈ, if we assume that there are at least D q 1 principals competing over agents at stage 1, then the mechanism implements the POMBS.
CONCLUSIONS
We have constructed two simple mechanisms that implement two bar-Ž . gaining sets. The first is a variation on the Zhou 1994 bargaining set and Ž . the second is the Pareto optimal subset of the Mas-Colell 1989 bargaining set. These mechanisms are more straightforward than those previously Ž . suggested by Einy and Wettstein 1999 . The simplicity is obtained at the Ž cost of introducing an auxiliary set of individuals as in Perez-Castrilló Ž ..
.
The implementation of the Pareto optimal subset of the Mas-Colell bargaining set turns out to be less elegant than that of the first bargaining set due to the need for the principals to use an explicit tie breaking rule. While one can see this as a weakness of the implementation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, the need for the rule is actually due to the fact that Mas-Colell justified objections are always efficient, that is, they all share the whole value of the coalition among its members. Hence, a property that seems desirable from a cooperative point of view interferes with the non-cooperative implementation through our class of mechanisms.
Appropriately modified mechanisms could similarly implement other bargaining sets where the treatment of objections and counter-objections Ž . is symmetric. It should be noted that the bargaining sets of Zhou 1994 Ž . and Aumann᎐Maschler 1964 do not fall into this class. It might well be that in order to implement these two bargaining sets one would have to resort to more sophisticated constructions.
